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ABSTRACT.
For when all is said and done, it is impossible to destroy anyone in absentiu or in effisie, -Freud (1912, p. 108) I was recently referred for projective testing of a woman who was hospitalized for depression and possible borderline personality disorder. The first session proceeded rather uneventfully;
she had a jaded, cynical style about her and tended to give up on tasks when she had the slightest reason to believe that she might not complete them successfully. When I returned for the second session, it was clear that she would not give me any more information unless I backed away from the more rigid testing format and simply talked with her for a while. After doing so for a half an hour, we returned to the testing, at which point she proceeded to keep me for two hours in order to complete a test that normally takes about 30 minutes.
At the end of the session, having manipulated me into staying (in various only dimly masked ways), she denounced me as a liar for having kept her beyond the hour-and-a-half that I had, the previous day, forecast for the second session.
D. M%sten
The process I had just experienced with this patient was far more useful diagnostically than an MMPI profile, a Hamilton depression score, or a set of TAT responses.
I came out of the session feeling as if I had victimized her, while in reality 1 had merely administered a standard battery of psychological tests. The theme of victimization permeated both the content and process of the testing, as she presented herself as a person who pushes people away with derision and cynicism in order to protect herself from the abuse she expects to receive. The extent to which she does this in all relationships obviously cannot be assessed in her interaction with a single tester in a single situation, but the fact that she turned a situation that most patients find somewhat anxiety-provokingbut basically benign-into a battle to protect herself from abuse clearly suggests something regarding the nature of her assumptions about the social world. The relatively brief relationship between this woman and myself thus proved to be a useful tool for the assessment of her object relations or "interpersonal schemata." Repeated encounters such as this led Freud to focus, as early as 1895, on the relationship between therapist and patient, and to the notion of transference. Freud noticed that the attitude of the patient toward the therapist continually kept interfering with the business at hand of uncovering memories and associations.
Eventually, he came to conclude that this peculiarity of the analytic situation is not in fact a hindrance but instead represents a fundamental part of the therapeutic process.
The aim of this paper is to reanalyze the concept of transference from an information processing perspective and to show, from that perspective, how utilization of the interpersonal process between patient and therapist can be therapeutically useful. We mean a transference of feelings on to the person of the doctor since we do not believe that the situation in the treatment could justify the development of such feelings. We suspect, on the contrary, that the whole readiness for these feelings is derived from elsewhere, that they were already prepared in the patient and, upon the opportunity offered by the analytic treatment, are transferred on to the person of the doctor. (p. 442) Before doing so it is important to note the parameters within which information-processing concepts can be expected to be useful. The notion that people 'Since this article was written, Singer (1985) has published an excellent paper in which he relates concepts of schema, script, and expectancy to the psychoanalytic notion of transference. (Shantz, 1983) , for example, are clearly of relevance to object-relations theory (see Westen, 1985) . This article represents an effort in that direction.
Transference as Person Schema/Object Representation
The concept of "schema" has a long history, dating back to Piaget (1926) and Bartlett (1932) , and it is currently being put to widespread use by social cognition researchers (e.g., Taylor & Cracker, 1981) . Within academic psychology, Cantor and Mischel (1979) A patient is always going to form a schema/object-representation of what the therapist is like, and this schema is likely to be distorted for both cognitive and motivational reasons, just as any social schema (or self-schema) is distorted.
In terms of cognitive biases, Nisbett and Ross (1980) have catalogued a host of such sources of error in person perception, and it is the fate of creatures who must construct their understanding of reality that their constructions will always be imperfect. From the motivational side, patients have any number of reasons to distort their perceptions of their therapists, some of which will be detailed below. For example, they may idealize the therapist in order to identify with him or her, or they may vilify her in order to avoid hearing something painful she or he has to say. Though one may be tempted to restrict the use of the word transference to schemas distorted by motivational factors, as Wachtel(l981) argues, separating reality from distortion in defining transference is no easy task, since in any relationship neither party has a monopoly on objectivity, and ambiguity calling for inference is the rule, not the exception. Various social schemas become transferentially relevant when they are evoked 'Landau and Goldfried (1981) have recently discussed the assessment of schemas in psychotherapy from a cognitive-behavioral standpoint.
because of similarity to the therapist or some situational cue. To the extent that the manner or appearance of the therapist resembles another person or exemplar of a category, schemas relevant to that person or category are likely to be activated. Freud (1912) adding that his students know precisely what they must do to receive a good grade. In this case an elaborate schema has been evoked, and one has reason to suspect that earlier aspects of the schema in which he was pupil rather than teacher were operative as well.
Transference as Attachment
A second aspect of transference is the patient's attachment to the therapist. One could account for this attachment in a number of ways. First, as Bowlby (1969 Bowlby ( , 1973 and others (e.g., Sroufe & Waters, 1979) h ave argued, human beings appear to have an innately based tendency to form attachments, and that a person would do so in a relationship which fits a number of personand situationprototypes of early attachments is not surprising. Freud meant by his comment that every object finding is really an object re-finding that we learn to love in the context of our early relationships with our caretakers, and that the understanding we form of love is forever conditioned by these experiences. From a cognitive perspective, one can readily see how one schema builds upon the next developmentally, and how early images of relationships may be integrated into later schemas. This is by no means to deny that significant accommodation occurs along the way; rather, it is to suggest that prototypes of love objects and modes of attaching formed in infancy and childhood are likely to exert influence on subsequent object choices because old schemas never die: they fade away through disuse, are incorporated in various ways into subsequent schemas, or are repressed and periodically activated without conscious awareness.
As I have argued elsewhere (Westen, 1985) , one need not accept the more mechanistic aspects of Freud's drive theory to believe in the impact of early object relations on later social experience.
One could argue, instead, that human infants have a genetically wired tendency toward social behavior and attachment, and that this differentiates into various social needs (including friendship, love, intimacy, sexual intimacy, etc.), rather than that all such needs are manifestations of the sexual instinct.
Any of these needs may be evoked in psychotherapy, so that one would expect to see, for example, erotic transferences as well as simple attachments to the therapist. As will be argued shortly, these various needs are likely to call upon similar information processing channels, so that in many cases they can be expected to arise in conjunction with one another.
Attachment to the therapist may arise through a second way. As Zajonc (1968) has shown, familiarity tends to lead to liking, and to the extent that the therapist becomes a familiar figure, he is likely to evoke positive feeling. Thirdly, symptom reduction, if attributed to therapy, will lead to attachment as the therapist becomes associated with relief, although the opposite side of this coin is that anxiety experienced in therapeutic work also becomes associated with the therapist (and frequently is responsible for premature terminations). Finally, telling intimate details of one's life to another person is likely to evoke schemas previously associated with attachment, such as parental schemas and "close friend" schemas.
Transference as Schema-Triggered Affecl
Clinicians frequently speak of transference when a patient expresses positive or negative feelings toward the therapist.
The patient may develop both continuous and momentary feelings toward the therapist just as he would toward anyone else.
These feelings must obviously be understood in the context of the person's prior experience, as resulting from interactions between that experience and the current situation.
Affects may be triggered directly by schemas activated through their perceived similarity to aspects of the therapist or therapy situation. Fiske (1982) has developed the notion of schema-triggered affect, by which she means that when features of a stimulus match characteristics of a cognitive prototype, the affect associated with the previous schema will be activated. In other words, classes of stimuliand she studied social stimuli in particularhave affects attached, so that presentation of a member of that class will evoke the categorybased affect. This is, of course, a phenomenon stereotype researchers (and victims of stereotypes) have known for decades. A member of a minority group may find that those around him begin with negative feelings toward him simply because they have attached an affect to a category, and he is an instance of that category.
Fiske 
Transference as Interpersonal Expectancies
People carry with them expectations about what the world holds in store, and these expectations apply not only to the natural world but to the social world as well. Rotter (1966) has emphasized the extent to which we form such expectancies about ourselves, such as internal or external locus of control.
Hume argued that as scientists we must make the rationally unfounded assumption that nature will continue to operate much the same tomorrow as it did today, and as intuitive scientists (Ross, 1977) Strupp & Binder, 1984) . While in theory the distinction between levels of expectancy has not been made in psychoanalytic writing on transference, in practice clinicians comment far less upon reactions to the therapist that appear idiosyncratic and situation-specific, as compared to those that emerge repeatedly in the patient's life.
Transference as Scripts
Another aspect of transference is the activation of scripts. Abelson (1981) and Schank and Abelson (1977) This particular patient not only behaved toward me as he had toward his mother but expected me to respond as she did, and he was at first angry and surprised when I did not. The script notion can encompass such schemas since it includes knowledge of reciprocal role relations.
Transference as Wishes
In the above example, one should note that the patient may not only have been activating an interactional script but may also have been wishing for a particular type of interaction that he expected to find gratifying. The script notion cannot speak to motivational factors such as the patient's desire for me to be like his mother.
One of the central aspects of transference described by psychoanalysts and psychodynamic psychotherapists is the activation of archaic wishes that are transferred onto the therapist. The question arises as to whether such phenomena can be usefully examined in relation to information-processing theory and research.
As yet, motivational constructs have not proven easily integrable into information processing theory. In a recent book (Westen, 1985) I have suggested that certain cognitive-affective structures may be useful in accounting for motivation and in integrating psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral theories. One form of these is the wish. A wish includes a cognition of a desired state and an anticipated affect associated with attainment of that state. It also includes a cognition of the current status of one's attainment or non-attainment of that state, and an affect arising from the discrepancy between desired and cognized reality. A person can be motivated to act either by the anticipated positive affect associated with attainment of the wish, or by the negative affect arising from the discrepancy between ideal and cognized reality. For example, a patient who has developed an erotic transference has a wish to have sexual contact with her or his therapist. This means that she has formed an affect-laden schema of an end-state or goal and is motivated to reduce the discrepancy between the goal and cognized reality by an aversive affect (e.g., a sense of longing) or by an imagined positive affect (e.g., joy or sexual gratification) if she could achieve her desire. She may achieve this goal in displacement by acting out behaviorally, or she may perform a mental operation, such as fantasizing, to allay her distress or achieve satisfaction. In both cases her action (either behavioral or mental) is motivated by an affect produced by this schema.
Every element of this cognitive-affective schema and the responses it evokes (including the affect-laden set-goal, the understanding of reality and expectations of resultant affect if the wish is fulfilled, the discrepancy, and the choice of response to the affect) has a history which is involved in producing the transference experience. Empirical research is also lacking on conditions for the evocation of wishes, but one has reason to suppose that one way they may be activated is through typical information processing channels, similar to the activation of other schemas (see, e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Anderson, 1983) . A wish may be viewed as a "node" on a semantic network which can be activated when other associations along the network have been "primed. In psychotherapy, wishes from previous situations and relationships may thus be evoked, so that the patient desires things from the therapist that she or he desired from significant others. Since the therapy relationship may be one of a small number of relationships with elements that resemble early relationships, the possibility arises that the patient may experience archaic wishes with the therapist that may have been dormant for years.
As with other schemas, one must distinguish between category levels with respect to wishes. Wishes may be quite general (e.g., broad interpersonal wishes such as the desire to be liked) or specific (e.g., the wish for one's father to stay home on one's birthday as a child rather than to travel out of town, to prove his affection).
Again, the clinician must attempt to discover the level of generality of wishes experienced toward the therapist and any pattern of their elicitation within and without the therapy situation.
Transference as Defense
Psychoanalytic psychologists argue that not only does transference entail the reenactment of archaic wishes, but that many of these wishes are repressed. One of the greatest stumbling blocks to integration of psychodynamic with information processing models is that cognitivists and psychodynamic psychologists disagree upon whether one needs to explain certain phenomena with motivational constructs (such as drives and defenses) or whether one can more parsimoniously explain the same phenomena in cognitive terms. Nisbett and Ross (1980) , for example, detail a bevy of factors that bias that "intuitive scientist's" understanding of self and others, and they argue for strictly cognitive explanations. Elsewhere (Westen, 1985) The basic notion is derived from systems theory and suggests that an individual establishes a "setgoal" or ideal state with respect to some stimulus or situation, and that a discrepancy or "mismatch" between set-goal and cognized reality produces an affect or feeling. The affect performs a feedback function, activating various control mechanisms designed to minimize the affect. These control mechanisms may be either behavioral or mental. The function of both is to alleviate the dysphoric affect, and to the extent that a control mechanism is successful, it will be "negatively reinforced" through its association with reduction of a painful emotional state. The behavior or defense mechanism will be encoded as a successful solution and will thus be more likely to be activated upon presentation of a similar situation. If, for example, a child develops death wishes toward a parent and compares these wishes with internalized moral standards, the discrepancy between these standards and cognized reality produces a painful affect, guilt. In order to alleviate the guilt, he may utilize a behavior (acting especially nice to the parent) or a defense (denying his aggressive wishes) or some combination of behavior and defense. In each case he is reducing the cognitive-evaluative mismatch between ideal and cognized reality, either by making reparation or by distorting his self-understanding. The result is a diminution of the guilt and an association of the control mechanism with guilt reduction. Repeated success with a particular mechanism may result in its automatic elicitation in similar circumstances. Again, in evaluating the use of such mechanisms a therapist must try to pin down the specificity or generality of their use and of the stimuli that elicit them. The notion of cognitive-evaluative mismatch is in many ways similar to Lazarus's (1981) 
The Assessment and Alteration of Scripts, Expectancies, and Wishes
One important use of transference is in the assessment and alteration of scripts, expectancies, and wishes. Transference phenomena allow the therapist to peer beyond the patient's self-reports by demonstrating in vivid detail the way the patient interacts with, and what the patient expects and desires from, significant others (see Strupp & Binder, 1984) . Th' is is not to imply that clinicians are always successful in assessing the generality of those schemas. Clinical inference is diflicult enough when dealing with behaviors, let alone with schemas (especially schemas uncovered through interaction). In this respect, the analysis of transference is a microcosm of social scientific method: it is at once hermeneutic and positivist. On the one hand, interpretation of transference material is a hermeneutic art, akin to the interpretation of a text because the words and deeds of the patient are likely to function as metaphor. This can be explained by examining the interaction of cognitive and dynamic processes.
Since certain thoughts and wishes are connected with painful affects, they are likely to be repressed and thus to remain inaccessible to consciousness. Yet cognitions associated with them may emerge into consciousness (because the repression does not obliterate the entire associational network), or be incorporated into easily assimilable aspects of the therapy situation, such as thoughts about the therapist or events being described in the treatment hour. The result is that the patient communicates in metaphor, and the interpretation of symbols is as difficult in therapeutic discourse as it is in literature.
On the other hand, once the therapist begins to suspect the presence of a latent web of associations, he must act like a natural scientist as hypothesis tester, presenting and listening for situations likely to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis.
He may speak to the patient in related metaphor or directly interpret the material and gauge the patient's reactions.
In his hypothesis-testing he is vulnerable to the same distortions as other "intuitive scientists" (Ross, 1977) , whose schemas tend to be more robust in assimilating or ignoring discrepant information than they should, but this is a limitation of all science, not just intuitive science or clinical practice.'
The relationship between therapist and patient is an invaluable source of information about the patient's interpersonal action schemas (scripts), assumptions about the social world (expectancies), and wishes. As noted earlier, a great deal of research has demonstrated that much of cognitive processing occurs outside of awareness, and decades of clinical work attests to the unconscious "processing" of motives and affects. Indeed, a wealth of experimental evidence has recently been adduced to document unconscious emotional processes as well (Westen, 1985) .
Many of these scripts, expectancies, and wishes become routinized and are activated automatically in relevant circumstances. Consequently, if recognized at all, they appear "natural" to the patient, who has been using them for years. The therapist may use such phenomena in the transference not only to learn about the patient's schemas but also to point them out to the patient and thus de-routinize them. By making these schemas explicit and conscious, the therapist can help the patient examine and change them if they appear to be erroneous or maladaptive.
The Uncovering of State-Dependent Memories and Schema-Triggered Affects
Much recent experimental research (Bower, 1981; Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Roth & Rehm, 1980; Clark & Teasdale, 1982) h as demonstrated the significance of feeling states on memory retrieval. This research has shown that retrieval of affectladen thoughts or memories is influenced by mood at the time of retrieval. Bower (1981) has applied this to both semantic and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972) and has demonstrated the effect of mood on recall of childhood memories.
To the extent that the therapeutic situation evokes old schemas, it is likely to activate associated affects, which in turn trigger state-dependent memories. Freud (1917, p. 454) similarly argued that a central function of transference is that it awakens old conflicts.
From a perspective that integrates cognitive and dynamic concepts, a conflict can be understood as the presence of wishes, cognitive-evaluative mismatches, or other cognitive-affective schemas, such that satisfaction of one such motive has a negative influence on another. Satisfaction of an aggressive wish, for example, may simultaneously conflict with an "ideal self' set-goal (or "superego prohibition"), producing a cognitive-evaluative mismatch and consequently a feeling of guilt. As psychoanalytic theory and practice suggests, the response to a conflict of this sort is likely to be a compromise formation. The utility of triggering such memories, affects, and conflicts is that they may lie at the root of dysfunctional behavior and mental processes. One of the fundamental assumptions of psychoanalytic method (see Rapaport, 1944) is that every thought, wish, and fantasy has a history. In Piagetian terms, every schema is the end-product of a series of assimilations and accommodations. A crucial aspect of the schemas determinative of much of human behavior-and of psychopathology -is that they are affective as well as cognitive.
* Kuhn (1970) , in fact, rejected Popper's (1963) view of science as a hypothetico-deductive, hypothesis-testing enterprise precisely because he found, in scrutinizing the history of science, that disconfirming instances only topple a paradigm when they are overwhelming and when an alternative paradigm is in existence. sort is that they may become repressed in childhood to avoid dysphoric affect. As a result, they may remain encapsulated in "pockets" of unworked-through cognitive-affective networks and may continue to direct thought and behavior. By bringing these cognitive-affective structures to consciousness, the patient can begin to reassess as an adult whether these structures are realistic and whether the way they were regulated in childhood should continue to operate. ' Freud (1937, p. 321) referred to this aspect of the therapeutic process as the replacement of an infantile decision by a more adaptive one. At times, the transference provides the only access to such material, by eliciting affects that recruit relevant memories and wishes. For example, a borderline patient whom I had been seeing for over a year started to withdraw without clear cause, refusing to talk and sitting glumly in her chair. We had previously discussed a similar pattern in her life of suddenly severing relations with people important to her, but the pattern was now emergingwith corresponding affect -in the transference. She was aware of her actions but angrily told me that she would not and could not explain them. I suggested to her that someone does not pull away from another person like that unless she is afraid of something, at which point she volunteered that she did not know what she feared, but that she was sure something terribly bad would happen if she did not run. The combination of her experiencing this feeling with me and eliciting thoughts and memories congruent with the affect allowed us to explore the fear behind her behavior, and repeated experiences of this sort allowed her both to reanalyze (cognitively) conditions under which fear has been inappropriately evoked, and to see that, in fact, her fears are not confirmed in interaction with me. This latter aspect of use of the transference is similar to in uiuo exposure techniques in behavioral treatment. Wachtel(l977) has lucidly argued for the importance of exposure to anxiety-provoking thoughts, images, and stimuli in both psychoanalytic and behavioral therapies, proposing jAnalysis of schema-related affects is central to both psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral understanding of behavior and psychopathology. For example, with respect to phobias, while the two approaches differ significantly in etiological theories, both presuppose (translating into information processing terms) that an affect has erroneously become attached to a cognitive representation, so that the person is afraid of an innocuous stimulus. Similarly, the person may have developed presently maladaptive self-efficacy and outcome expectancies (Bandura, 1977 (Bandura, , 1982 at a time in which they may or may not have been appropriate, and bringing these to light can help the person alter his behavior. that the gradual movement from screen memories and thoughts to more deeply repressed material is, in part, similar to systematic desensitization.
The Reworking of Behavioral and Intrapsychic Affect-Regulation Mechanisms
In the above example, one avenue for making inroads on the patient's very problematic object relations was to address her pattern of withdrawing from intimate relationships as a way of reducing her fear. She was afraid both of her own rage and destructiveness and of the motives of anyone who would become close to her, and these fears had roots in her earliest experiences of intimacy and closeness.
In order to be of help to someone in a situation such as this, the therapist must first point out the behavior, then link it with the affect, explore the source of the affect (which in this case no longer conforms to reality), and finally either reduce the affect or help the patient develop a more adaptive response. The patient has good reason to avoid awareness of such defenses because their use has been "reinforced" by the elimination of a painful affect. The patient is thus unlikely to be willing to relinquish a defense unless he has come to see that the situation is not so unpleasant or frightening, or that he can respond to it in ways that will not so greatly compromise other motives or produce as much distress. Examination of transference is especially useful because it allows the therapir directly to observe the behavioral and defensive processes the patient brings to bear, especially in social situations.
It also gives the therapist concrete and mutually verifiable evidence of these processes to help the patient recognize them, even when doing so is threatening or painful. In addition, bringing to light conflictual material allows for the emergence of more deeply buried issues that are themselves likely to emerge in the transference, in part sometimes creating what psychoanalysts refer to as the "transference neurosis" (see, e.g., Blum, 1971; Weinshel, 1971) . Further, Freud emphasized the patient's use of transference as resistance, a resistance which, if not interpreted, can frequently lead to termination of treatment.
This resistance may emerge whether or not the therapist believes in the concept of transference (see Wachtel, 1982) . One could conclude from all this that Freud was overstating the matter somewhat when he claimed that the transference is the battlefield upon which all battles must be fought in psychotherapy (1917, p. 454) . The schemas and affect-regulation mechanisms evoked in therapy are only a subset of the person's repertoire, albeit a subset to which the therapist will have greater access and with which he is more likely to effect lasting change. ' Nevertheless, while Freud was not entirely correct in asserting, in the passage with which this paper began, that one can never destroy anyone in absentia, he was no doubt brilliantly insightful in his recognition that even a straw man burns faster than a memory.
CONCLUSIONS
'~For a more detailed discussion, particularly as applied to short-term psychodynamic psychotherapy, see Westen (1986) .
'A tendency to exaggerate the role of transference is not surprising in a therapeutic mode in which the therapist must take such a self-abnegatory stance, utilizing his own feelings only insofar as they provide insight into the patient's conflicts and the interpersonal process. Transference is a way for the therapist to bring himselfeven a distorted version thereofinto his work.
